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the tendency is to throw back upon purely mechanical neural processes the explanation of activities previously regarded as indicative of highly elaborate conscious instincts. In passing, it may be said that this disposition of modern science, which is so unwelcome to much of prevalent sentiment, because it seems to depreciate the sacred mystery of animal life and conduct, represents no passing materialistic whim, but is based upon the best obtainable evidence.

Readers of Dr. Weir's book get no suggestion of this tendency, and in so far are misled as to the latest relevant scientific doctrines. After all, this does not prevent the author from coming out at the end with a conclusion essentially that of the current psychology of the day, *i. e.*, that the consciousness of animals differs from human consciousness in no assignable particular, beyond that of extent and complexity in development.

Dr. Weir writes with an enthusiasm which is contagious, and the critic's task is thereby rendered doubly ungracious.

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INSTINCT AND REASON: An Essay concerning the Relation of Instinct to Reason, with some Special Study of the Nature of Religion. By HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL, M.A. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1898. Pp. xiii + 574. \$3.50.

THIS is one of the most stimulating of philosophical treatises which have appeared in recent years. Its attractiveness is due, first, to the breadth of the inquiry, which embraces the study of living beings from the lowest forms to man; secondly, to the thoroughgoing adoption of the doctrine of development whereby the life of man is involved in and explicable in relation to the life of all other organisms; thirdly, to its discussion of all this field from the biological point of view as distinguished from the dogmatic or speculative; and, fourthly, to its inclusion of the problem of religion in the field of discussion and its attempt at the solution of the problem by the method employed to solve other problems of life, as indicated above.

The author tells us that his first purpose was to expound his view of religion as an instinctive element of man's nature. But in connection with this he was led to make a thorough study of instinct in general and its relation to other elements in organic life. From this he was led to the exposition of the relations of instinct and reason and of the connection of religion and morality. This essay of over five

hundred large pages is the result, of which the following paragraphs are a summary.

Three main classes of instinct are found to exist. First are those that tend to bring about the persistence of individual life; second, those that result in actions favoring the persistence of the species to which the individual belongs; third, those that tend to bring about the persistence of certain aggregates of individuals which we call social groups. On the basis of biological data this classification is shown to be in the order of time, and the later has in each case grown up in relation with the former by the subordination of the earlier and lower instincts to the later and higher. Now, this relation of subordination between the great classes of instincts is the expression of the growth and fixation in life of that which has been found to be most advantageous for life. The process which has subordinated the first class, though prior in time, to the third class, the social instincts, testifies to the supreme importance of the social organism.

But biological science has identified another principle than that of instinct which leads to a typical series of actions, viz., the tendency to vary from this typical series. Thus from each class of these instinct-actions there are examples of variation, arising out of sundry causes. Now, the tendency to vary from the typical or instinct-actions is most marked in the third or highest class of such actions, viz., in the sphere of the social organism. Both the complexity and the looseness characteristic of society as an organism are responsible for this tendency which, if not checked, will in time substitute the lower for the higher instinct-actions.

We are, therefore, led to expect that in human evolution will be produced another instinct, separate from all others, which will reveal itself as a governing force, regulative of variations, in the interests of instincts as a class, particularly those tending to racial progress. Such a governing instinct our author finds religion to be, since, first, religious actions are organic, and, secondly, serve precisely the biologic end of restraining variant actions in the social organism. In favor of the organic character of religion is (1) its universality in man and its limitation to man alone, (2) its spontaneous development in man. The biologic end which is served by it is the restraint it brings upon individual variant action by withdrawing the individual from the influence of the stimuli which induce variation and thus permitting the racial instincts to be heard and their power felt. In the exposition of this view the author has brought forward the witness from primitive religion,

and, indeed, from the history of religion generally, emphasizing those features of religion which consist in separating the individual from the world, such phenomena as the dream and vision, the notion of a supernatural power, the hermit life, fasting, prayer, sacrifice, celibacy, etc.

A most interesting section of the book is taken up with the proof that the highest and most significant forms of the variant actions which oppose the typical actions of instinct are those which in consciousness appear as the result of the action of reason. Hence arises a seeming opposition of reason and instinct, involving the problem of the relation of reason and faith, the expression of the governing instinct, religion. At first it seems that the writer is taking the well-known position of Benjamin Kidd that religion is ultra-rational; that reason and faith are fundamentally contradictory. But the difference lies in the author's view that both instinct and variation from instinct are biologically fundamental, and that reason is therefore in opposition to instinct only when we look at complex organic forms. Both are, elementally, but aspects of the basic tendency to the persistence of life.

Hence, finally, the service of reason and of religion in human life may be thus stated: Morality which depends on instinct, itself embodying so many distinct purposes, and subject to variations which multiply as the organism grows complex, is no stable affair with an absolute standard. It grows with the growth of the organism. True morality is, for the race, the acting on impulses arising from instincts which are making for the progress of the race; for the individual, it is acting on the best one knows. The part of religion in both cases is not to better morality. It cannot make men better morally. But it restrains them from acting on the impulses roused by the lower and immediate instincts until the higher and more slowly acting impulses make themselves felt. Reason, however, is the active agent in bringing about progress in morals, since, when all the evidence is in, its work is to decide which impulse shall be followed. It may thus even decide against the evidence that religion has brought before the mind, though this decision involves the greatest risk. But, after all, we cannot overestimate the service rendered by the religious instinct in holding back the decision in the interests of the higher instincts. The final rule of conduct, therefore, which the author lays down as the summation of his essay is this: "Act to restrain the impulses which demand immediate reaction, in order that the impulse order determined

by the existence of impulses of less strength, but of wider significance, may have full weight in the guidance of your life. In other words, *be religious.*"

It is impossible, in this place, to do more than to allude to the many special discussions of living questions in religion and morals which are given in this essay, most striking because from so new a point of view. On the essay as a whole it may be remarked that evidently the psychological inquiry, which is here solely pursued, cannot speak the last word on the subject of religion. It is determinist. It knows no God but the human spirit. It recognizes and traces instinct, but can give no hint of its origin. If this essay pretends to give a complete account of religion, we cannot but be dismayed at the havoc it makes in all that religious men hold sacred, such as otherworldliness, mystery, the sanctities and the aspirations of the religious life. But it is a contribution to the psychological analysis of religion alone, and it is to be welcomed as such, since it is an earnest, serious, profound, and, we had almost said, reverent study, which must be dealt with by all who go beneath the surface, and who welcome light from all quarters upon this, the greatest of all subjects of human investigation.

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DIE SEELENTHEORIE, UND DIE GESETZE DES NATÜRLICHEN EGOISMUS UND DER ANPASSUNG. Von F. HANS PAUL. Berlin: Carl Duncker's Verlag, 1899. Pp. 292. M. 5.

THE author's aim is to furnish an incontestable proof, by the inductive method, that the commonly accepted belief in a divinely implanted "soul" is a myth; that the activities of the human mind, from the lowest to the highest, from the simplest to the most complex, are entirely mechanical and corporeal in their origin and nature; and that human activities differ in no respect, save in degree of complexity, from those of the lower orders of being. The highest exercise of human reflection or volition is not different in kind from that movement of a plant in a dark cellar whereby it grows up toward the solitary ray of light.

By the law of natural egoism, then, the author means that every living organism is filled with an overmastering impulse toward the maintenance of its own "integrity," and that of the species to which it belongs. This impulse is the direct consequence of *life* as such; and if it proves the presence of an intelligent soul in the case of man, then